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FOREWORD
This study has been written for the project ‘Enlargement of the EU to Central and Eastern
Europe (CEE)’ that the Netherlands Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) has on its
working programme. One of the central questions in this project is how far the accession of
the CEE countries will increase the diversity within the Union. To what extent will reform of
the existing institutions be needed to maintain their effectiveness, legitimacy and cohesion?
In preparation for a report to the government on these issues, which will be published later,
the WRR commissioned a number of studies and assessments on developments in Central
Europe on the one hand and in the European Union on the other hand. The present study is
the first of these background studies; the others will be published over the months to come.
The authors are dr. Eric Philippart, senior researcher at the Belgian National Fund for
Scientific Research (FNRS – Université Libre de Bruxelles) and professor at the College of
Europe (Bruges), and Monika Sie Dhian Ho, member of the scientific staff of the Council.
They studied the various strategies to manage diversity and maintain the Union’s capacity to
act after enlargement, as well as the potential consequences of these strategies for the EU
system of governance. This first product of their research addresses more specifically the
opportunities and risks of closer cooperation between Member States of the Union as a way
to overcome blockages in EU decision-making. Their thorough evaluation of the pros and
cons of closer cooperation provides clarity into the debates which are being held in the
context of the Intergovernmental Conference of 2000 and which will continue thereafter,
since the issue of flexibility or differentiation in the integration process will remain on the
agenda for the time to come.
Prof. Michiel Scheltema
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The provisions on ‘closer cooperation’ are the main conceptual and procedural innovation
introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam. Since May 1999, Member States who are willing and
able to further cooperation among themselves may make use of the institutions, procedures
and mechanisms laid down by the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty
establishing the European Community (TEC). General clauses set out in Title VII of the TEU
(Articles 43 to 45) define the objectives, scope and procedures of eligible closer cooperation.
These clauses are supplemented by specific criteria and procedures relating to the TEC
(Article 11) and to TEU Title VI on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Article
40).
The ambition of this report is to provide decision-makers with a number of policy
recommendations on the question of the revision of closer cooperation (which elements
should be preserved, amended or added), as well as its degree of urgency. The policy
recommendations are deduced from the answers given to three questions: Does the Union
need TEU Title VII closer cooperation? Do the provisions on closer cooperation need to be
revised? Do the provisions on closer cooperation need to be revised during the
Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 2000?
The pros and cons of various arguments have been evaluated from an integrationist
perspective, assuming that more and more problems cannot be solved without effective EU
institutions. These institutions are said to be effective if, first and foremost, they manage to
aggregate the interests and preferences of the various Member States, and take collective
decisions. The contribution of different instruments and practices to that decision-making
capacity has been an important criterion in the evaluation. The capacity to manage diversity
and act effectively is however not the only key element for the development of the Union. A
number of additional criteria has therefore been taken into account for the evaluation of
closer cooperation: democratic legitimacy, cohesion of the Union, solidarity between the
Member States, and consideration for the interests of the lighter-weight Member States.
                                                       
* We wish to thank our WRR-colleagues Wendy Asbeek Brusse, Gijs Berends, Michiel Scheltema and Jan
Schoonenboom for their most valuable comments, as well as Simone Langeweg and Marja Nuijten for their help
in the final editing of this study.
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The report presents, analyses and evaluates the main logical arguments against and in favour
of the existing provisions on closer cooperation (section 1), their revision (section 2) and their
revision during the IGC 2000 (section 3). Organising the terms of the debate in this way has
the advantage of simplicity and greater readability. The answers to these three questions lead
to a number of policy recommendations exposed in the last section (section 4).
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1 DOES THE UNION NEED TEU TITLE VII CLOSER COOPERATION?
1.1 Arguments against closer cooperation
1.1.1 Existing instruments are sufficient to manage EU’s diversity
Argument: The capacity of existing techniques of diversity management in the Union should
not be underestimated. Their potential has not been fully exploited yet. Blockages of
negotiations can be overcome by resorting more quickly and systematically to actual voting
(‘suppressing diversity’) instead of searching endlessly for consensus. Side-payments or
linkages can be used to buy off Member States stalling a process (‘trading off’ diversity).
Gridlock might be avoided by resorting more to, among other things, aid programmes,
exchange, benchmarking and peer review which accelerate catch-up and convergence
(diminishing diversity). Diverging interests can be dealt with through various forms of
‘flexible’ arrangements granting transition periods or permanent exemptions to Member
States, i.e. by varying their participation in those regimes and policies (‘accommodating’
diversity). Another effective way to accommodate diversity is recourse to lighter regulatory
forms like minimum standards, mutual recognition and outline legislation, all techniques
extensively used for the completion of the internal market. Finally, problems of integration
can be solved by the development of cooperation outside the EU framework, on a formal or
informal ad hoc basis (‘circumventing’ diversity). In sum, closer cooperation is dispensable,
one of the proofs being that it has, as yet, never been used.
Evaluation: The EU’s institutional potential has indeed not been fully exploited so far. The
management of an enlarged Union will most certainly require resorting to various mixes of
instruments suppressing, trading-off, diminishing, accommodating or circumventing
diversity. The capacity of these instruments is nevertheless not unlimited and we can already
foresee that more extensive use of some of them could have negative effects. For instance,
resorting systematically to Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in a system with limited capacity
to offer (financial) compensations might quickly become too brutal for those who are
regularly outvoted. What has been sometimes described as a Rotarian atmosphere presiding
over Community decision-making will further deteriorate, with the multiplication of
decisions ‘pre-cooked’ in bilateral contacts, informal cores and ruthless practices. Other
combinations of diminishing and/or trading-off instruments can of course be envisaged to
avoid the recourse to QMV. Soft law, benchmarking and policy transfer contributing to
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diminish diversity have indeed a genuine potential. Yet the degree of convergence they
produce is uncertain and their pace usually slow. As to instruments trading off diversity, their
effectiveness has other limitations. Package dealing depends very much on the willingness of
the dissenting Member States to put their diversity in brackets and the other Member States
to buy and/or trade it off. In times of budgetary restriction, the likeliness of large
unconditional side-payments decreases. These side-payments may then be replaced by
package deals with few direct financial consequences. Besides the fact that this type of
package deals is usually more difficult to construct, package dealing in general presents the
disadvantage of being rather messy, not addressing the source of the problem and having a
limited cohesive potential. Resorting time and again to ad hoc flexible arrangements or
case-by-case opt-outs in order to accommodate diversity will harm the transparency and
readability of EU activities. Circumventing diversity by cooperating outside the EU framework
can be effective to put pressure on dissenting Member States, swiftly develop new
cooperation regimes or provide leadership. Yet it comes with the practical difficulties of
extra-EU cooperation, the political problems generated by directoires and the risk of a
multiplication of parallel regimes duplicating or emptying existing EU/EC policies. It could be
one of the most divisive options for EU/EC integrative ambitions (see 1.2.6). This quick review
shows that it would be presumptuous to claim that the existing toolbox will suffice to deal
with diversity in a Union of 30 members.
As to the non-use of the provisions on closer cooperation, the fact can be explained by
different causes. A first explanation could be that, closer cooperation being an instrument of
last resort, one should not expect to see it used right away. The immediate objection is of
course that, in the Union, there is no shortage of long-pending proposals which would
certainly meet the last resort condition. The legislation on a European Company Statute is
one of them and has been the subject of a preliminary study of closer cooperation’s
applicability. This case shows three things. First, the acclimatisation of Member States to new
mechanisms invariably requires time and it has been only nine months since the Treaty of
Amsterdam entered into force. Hesitation and reluctance to use closer cooperation remain
strong. Second, Member States are still willing to go to great lengths to find a compromise
and/or wait for the next national election which will remove the ‘recalcitrant’ government
from office. Third, the current design of the mechanism does not allow to deal with
contentious issues, since each Member State has the right to veto the authorisation of closer
cooperation on the basis of “important and stated reasons of national policy” (the so-called
‘emergency brake’). None of these phenomena is actually demonstrating that the principle
underlying closer cooperation is dispensable. In conclusion, closer cooperation should be
conceived as an addition to rather than a substitute for the existing toolbox for diversity
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management. As it stands, it provides an alternative solution for a limited number of
immediate and future non controversial situations.
1.1.2 The difficulty of identifying areas requiring closer cooperation
demonstrates its uselessness
Argument: A general regime for closer cooperation is useless, the proof being that no policy
areas have been or can be identified as requiring closer cooperation.
Evaluation: A fundamental objection to the argument is that the usefulness of a regime is not
necessarily reflected by the number of identifiable cases for application. Some regimes are
pulled by events, others are developed in the abstract, before they arise (cf. the ‘safety valve’
or ‘just in case’ approach presented below, see 1.2.5). A more direct, and perhaps convincing,
answer to the argument is that it is factually incorrect. A list of areas to which closer
cooperation could be applied was for instance already circulated in 1996 by the Irish
Presidency, referring to education, professional training, youth, culture, public health,
tourism, energy, civil protection, trans-European networks, industry, research and
technological development (R&TD), development cooperation and social policy (the fight
against social exclusion). Since then practitioners and academics have, in addition, pointed at
corporate legislation, energy (fiscal regimes to encourage or deter the use of specific
energies), environment, international trade in services as well as various EMU-linked
cooperations (prudential rules, corporate taxes, regulation of financial markets and stock
exchanges, etc.). For the third pillar, exchange of information and the harmonisation of
extradition and hot pursuit rules have also been evoked as possible cases for closer
cooperation.
1.1.3 Closer cooperation will push the Union in uncharted and potentially dangerous waters
Argument: Closer cooperation is characterised by fundamental ambiguities. The objectives of
Member States backing closer cooperation are diverse and, for some, contradictory. Official
and honourable justifications hide other agendas. Furthermore and perhaps more
importantly the consequences of closer cooperation for the EU system of governance are
unpredictable but possibly very dangerous.
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Evaluation: It is true that the debate about flexibility is replete with terminological and
semantic confusion. It is also exact that, during the 1996-7 IGC, closer cooperation was
promoted on the basis of very different agendas (Stubb 1999). Some might still cherish it as a
potential tool for consolidating a ‘hegemonic core’ or making sure that the rich Member
States will not have ‘to pay for the others’. Meanwhile, to have a hidden agenda is one thing,
to be able to implement it through closer cooperation is another. That is to say, one must
study if closer cooperation would lend itself to such purposes. The establishment of a
hegemonic core is doubtful (see below 1.1.4). On the question of the club of the ‘selfish rich’,
much will depend on the negotiations around actual closer cooperation endeavours (see
below 1.1.5).
As to the evaluation of the consequences of the usage of closer cooperation for the EU system
of governance, the task is relatively difficult but not impossible. When the potential impact of
the reweighting of voting rights in the Council or the extension of QMV has to be assessed, the
analysis can build on the knowledge we have of previous changes in these domains. Closer
cooperation having, on the contrary, been introduced only recently, there is no or little
historical record. It is however not an entirely new tool in the EU panoply for diversity
management. A large part of it is a codification and rationalisation of pre-existing
instruments. In that respect, its evaluation can draw upon the lessons learned from other
forms of flexibility within the Union. Referring to the ambition of willing and able Member
States to move ahead, closer cooperation corresponds to a – more positive – philosophy
which departs from flexibility associated with opt-outs for the unable and unwilling Member
States. It is, by comparison, more centripetal than most flexible arrangements used by the EU
so far. Its extensive use would nevertheless push the Union further in the direction of a multi-
speed and variable geometry Europe, made of a core of activities in which all Member States
participate, supplemented by various functional groupings in which participation is optional.
The impact on decision-making capacity, democratic legitimacy, cohesion of the Union,
solidarity between Member States and consideration for the interests of lighter-weight
Member States are examined infra (see Philippart & Sie Dhian Ho 2000). Suffice to say here
that a lot will depend on the format of closer cooperation projects (the Treaties only set a
general principle and stipulate a number of basic obligations, rights and interdictions; the
detailed and specific policy arrangements will have to be negotiated each time an
authorisation is requested). If the projects are conceived in a fairly open way and
accompanied by adequate bridging mechanisms between the ‘ins’ and ‘outs’, this form of
flexibility might make a substantial contribution to the problem-solving capacity and
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integrative dynamics of the EU system. If not, the closer cooperation risks to become a source
of frustration, fracture and fragmentation.
1.1.4 Closer cooperation will lead to the development of a hegemonic core
Argument: Repeated use of closer cooperation will lead to the constitution of a hegemonic
core within the Union, transforming the large majority of Member States into decision takers.
Evaluation: A core Europe is unlikely to emerge from the repeated use of closer cooperation.
First of all, it is not clear whether this instrument would be used to push through rather
narrowly delineated projects (for instance, the creation of a European Company Statute) or
more substantial policy packages (for instance, an entire code on employment, working
conditions and social protection). In any case, future reinforced cooperations are expected to
remain of an incremental nature and follow a sectoral logic. The fact that some Member
States would participate in all instances of cooperation would therefore not necessarily put a
world between them and the other Member States, or mean they share a common strategic
vision on the finalités politiques of the Union, two defining conditions of a political core.
One could also point to the fact that, as a consequence of the obligation for closer cooperation
to involve ‘at least a majority of Member States’, the only group of countries likely to be part
of all cooperations (i.e. the six founding Member States) would have to cooperate with other
Member States. In the present configuration and even more after enlargement, this means
substantial heterogeneity for the group cooperating more closely and difficulty for it to act as
a unitary hegemon.
What could happen nonetheless is that the settings provided by closer cooperation are used
as a place to ‘pre-cook’ decisions which have to be formally taken in the Council of Ministers.
The Euro-11 informal Council for instance could be seen as a precursor of what could emerge
from closer cooperation. Its members represent more than the qualified majority in the
Council and already have the opportunity to act like a caucus. Supposing that the group has a
taste for hegemonic behaviour and is indeed pre-cooking decisions on Euro flanking policies,
it would still have to cope with the caucuses of other important areas of the Union, such as
defence. The existence of different caucuses overlapping to varying degrees is a positive
element for the Union. Cross-cutting cleavages are indeed less threatening for the system
than a repeated clash between the same groups. This also protects to some extent the Union
from the emergence of a hegemon or directoire. The foregoing does not imply that closer
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cooperation will be above or beyond politics and power games. It could certainly affect the
balance of power within the Union and the division of labour among Member States, but not
along a hegemonic pattern.
1.1.5 Closer cooperation will contribute to a ‘club of the selfish rich’ within the Union
Argumentation: Closer cooperation would contribute to the creation of a ‘club of the selfish
rich Member States’, excluding the Member States which are willing but unable to cooperate
more closely.
Evaluation: The absence of any reference to bridging mechanisms in the provisions (i.e.
helping non participating Member States to catch up with the front-runners) is a clear
indication that the unable should rely on self-help rather than assistance if they wish to join
closer cooperation. This absence does not preclude however that solidarity measures can be
agreed upon when closer cooperation proposals are actually on the negotiation table. Thanks
to the right of veto in the procedure triggering closer cooperation, the unable are indeed in a
position to exchange the authorisation of closer cooperation against some form of assistance
– provided of course that the willing are resourceful, very eager to move ahead and cannot
proceed through extra-EU cooperation (on consensus and cohesion within the EU, see below
1.1.6).
It must also be noted that, in many cases, the dividing line between participating and
non-participating Member States will be a question of like-mindedness, not of resources  (cf.
the example of the European Company Statute or EMU-linked regulatory harmonisation). The
fact that limited financial means will often not be an obstacle to participation should reassure
the economically weaker about the nature of the ‘clubs’ founded through closer cooperation.
1.1.6 Closer cooperation will undermine EU consensual politics
Argument: Closer cooperation is dangerous because it undermines EC/EU decision-making
norms which are essential for the development of a stable Union. Willing and able Member
States will not have to wait for policy-windows any more, neither offer dissenting Member
States package-deals or side-payments, nor strive at lengths to reach consensus on EC/EU
collective action.
17
Evaluation: Generally speaking, closer cooperation is neither supposed to become the
standard way to do business within the Union, nor a substitute for EU-wide cooperation. It
has been very explicitly designed as an instrument of last resort, as a tool to overcome major,
exceptional and enduring obstacles. The development of the acquis must remain an EC/EU
collective endeavour. This being said, one must admit that the existence of closer cooperation
is likely to affect decision-making in sectors relying on consensus and package dealing. Is that
a bad thing? As already mentioned (see above 1.1.1), package dealing often produces sub-
optimal policy outcomes. It could also be argued that the current practice in the Council is
over-consensual or unduly paralysing (to come back to our example, the idea of a European
Company Statute has been proposed in the 1970s). In some cases, using closer cooperation as
a negotiating lever would put an additional pressure on opponents. As Schengen has shown,
the threat of being excluded from the benefits of closer cooperation and/or the perspective of
being exposed to negative policy externalities can contribute to speed up the adoption of
collective decisions. In other cases, when a collective decision proves impossible, closer
cooperation offers the possibility of another type of consensual outcome, by which Member
States agree that the majority should not be obstructed and the minority not constrained (see
below 1.2.2). In that context and from a problem-solving perspective, closer cooperation is a
welcome option. Its indirect impact on convergence programmes for weaker Member States,
often approved as part of package deals, is certainly more worrying.
In conclusion, while the introduction of the new device is likely to affect the decision-making
practices in policy areas where the Treaties authorise closer cooperation and in related areas,
its impact will not be necessarily negative or increase antagonisms as far as the relationship
between willing and unwilling Member States is concerned. Its consequences for the able-
unable relationship and, by consequence, for the cohesion of the Union, are potentially more
problematic. This concern could however be addressed on a case-by-case basis (see 1.1.5).
1.1.7 Closer cooperation will harm the acquis
Argument: Closer cooperation is dangerous because it will affect the acquis in a negative way.
Evaluation: A first and straight answer to this argument is that, in many areas, closer
cooperation would build on very limited acquis, if any (cf. the example of the European
Company Statute). Put differently, there is little possibility to affect negatively a quasi
non-existent acquis. In the other cases, the acquis is protected by the very strict wording of
the enabling conditions written in the Treaties which stipulate that closer cooperation ‘does
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not affect’ the acquis. The close involvement of the supranational institutions in closer
cooperation is a further substantial guarantee. The Commission, through its proposals in the
first pillar and its opinions in the third pillar, has the means to take preventive action against
any possible damaging measures for the acquis. The European Court of Justice may in
addition be called upon to judge whether the enabling conditions have been respected. In
such a context, the risk to the acquis has probably been exaggerated.
A more hazardous, yet still very speculative, consequence could result from the symbolic
meaning of the constitutional enshrinement of flexibility in the Treaties. Closer cooperation
has broken a major taboo or opened Pandora’s box in the domain of the development of the
acquis and this precedent could shake the foundations of the orthodoxy presiding over the
adoption of the acquis by new Member States. In other words, it could be an invitation to
abandon or relax the principle of the integrity of the acquis and envisage regressive
flexibility. Especially in the context of strong political pressure in favour of a rapid
enlargement to CEE or even Balkan countries which might not be able to adopt and
implement parts of the acquis, this downward extrapolation of the flexibility logic could
potentially form a big threat to the Community method.
1.1.8 Closer cooperation will affect negatively the role of the Commission
Argument: Closer cooperation is dangerous because it affects negatively the neutrality of the
Commission. The Commission will have to take side and act in favour of a group of Member
States (by submitting a proposal or giving a positive opinion on a proposal) against another
group (the unable and/or unwilling Member States). This will damage the impartiality the
Commission needs to fulfil its role as a mediator and referee in the Union decision-making
process.
Evaluation: The Commission is not (or not only) an honest broker between the Member
States and institutions. The first mission of the Commission is to bring forward what is,
according to its views, necessary for the Union. The Commission embraces causes and in the
process forms alliances with governments which defend the same causes. Governments,
suspicious of the Commission and its policy lines, might mistakenly interpret these alliances
as the Commission ‘taking side’ with some Member States. In such a context, if the same
group of Member States is behind most closer cooperation requests, closer cooperation might
indeed reinforce the impression that the Commission is favouring some Member States to the
detriment of the others. It is the Commission responsibility to set out to demonstrate as
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much as possible its impartiality, knowing that some governments will never be convinced.
This argument should not lead to refrain from using closer cooperation.
1.1.9 Closer cooperation leads to a less transparent and readable Union
Argument: With the development of closer cooperations, the structure and activities of the
Union will become less transparent and readable for its citizens as well as for third countries.
Evaluation: The Union, like most political systems, relies on two types of legitimacy.
Transparency and readability of its institutions, together with other democratic and legal
characteristics, are a first and major source of legitimacy for the system. Put differently, the
basis of the acceptance of a system is its capacity to organise the ‘government by the people’,
have a strong parliament and institutions open to public scrutiny. This ‘input-legitimacy’ is
seen as vital by the proponents of a state-like evolution for the Union. A second and no less
important source of legitimacy stems from what the system achieves, the benefits it brings to
its members (a ‘government for the people’). For tenants of intergovernmental and/or
regulatory conceptions of the EU, the production of ‘output-legitimacy’ has the absolute
priority.
From this double perspective on legitimacy, it could be said that the use of closer cooperation
would certainly not contribute to the transparency and readability of the current structures of
the EU, already extremely complex and often denounced as opaque. Nonetheless, if closer
cooperation is the key to more effective policies, it would contribute to boost EU
output-legitimacy. The (limited) loss of input-legitimacy could therefore be more than
compensated by a gain in effectiveness and efficiency. The importance of the trade-off has to
be assessed on a case-by-case basis, the damage done in terms of input-legitimacy being
ideally kept to a minimum (insofar as the European project is not an intergovernmental
enterprise).
As far as the third countries are concerned, it seems obvious that closer cooperation is not
going to contribute to an already poor understanding of the Union. While this might have
been an asset in a limited number of international negotiations, the lack of readability has
more often brought disappointments, misunderstandings or tensions with the EU’s main
partners. Consequently, proposals to start closer cooperation should be carefully studied to
see if gains outweigh this particular cost.
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1.2 Arguments in favour of closer cooperation
1.2.1 The post-enlargement Union will need a new form of subsidiarity
Argument: In their 1995 study for the WRR Helen and William Wallace were warning that ”…
there is a tension between Europe the region and Europe the collective power, which can
perhaps not be reconciled easily within a single cooperative framework.” With the opening of
the Union to almost all countries in Europe, there will be a need for sub-systems to cooperate
more closely.
Evaluation: The next two or three waves of enlargement will change dramatically the nature
of the Union. Never was the group of candidate countries so large nor so different from the
incumbent Member States. By comparison with the previous enlargements of the Union, the
Central and Eastern European countries have to bridge much wider gaps. The transformation
of their political, economic, judicial and administrative systems is still in a consolidation
phase, while their civil societies have to be (re)built almost from scratch. At the same time the
requirements for accession to the EU have reached new summits as a consequence of the very
substantial development of the acquis over the last decade. Considering, on the one hand, the
magnitude of the catch-up required and, on the other hand, the high political pressure for
swift enlargement, the remaining diversity at the moment of accession is expected to be
substantial. These substantial (objective) differences linked to the level of socio-economic
development, institutional capacity or the geo-economic situation could well be coupled with
an increase in subjective or political heterogeneity. The CEE countries have indeed just
regained their national sovereignty and autonomy, and in many cases lack a political culture
of compromise building.
The Union will therefore soon be faced with all the risks of dilution, blockages of
decision-making and paralysis of the integration process that come with its conversion into
an organisation for the entire European sub-continent. Some integrative endeavours which
would be considered now as EC/EU-wide will, after the enlargement, only be appealing to
sub-systems within the EU (regionally and/or functionally defined). Harmonization which
might be functional for incumbent Member States (e.g. high standards for water
management) will be dysfunctional for several new Member States (e.g. because their
population density is much lower or the cost of these measures is unaffordable). Enlargement
should not prevent current Member States from harvesting the benefits of an institutional
structure they have been building for decades. They should not be obliged to create new
structures to pursue objectives written in the European Treaties. If no consensus can be
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found for EC/EU-wide action, a group of Member States should therefore be authorised to
make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by the Treaties, to
cooperate more closely among themselves. A new type of subsidiarity is needed, under which
some Member States stick to national solutions whereas others choose to adopt regional ones
– that is, solutions jointly pursued by eight or more Member States participating in a given
project. Closer cooperation can meet this need, introducing what Bribosia and Tuytschaever
see as a form of “differentiated subsidiarity” (Bribosia 1998; Tuytschaever 1999). This
possibility is one of the most solid arguments in favour of closer cooperation.
Significant development of the acquis through flexible arrangement can also be obtained
through the so-called ‘predetermined flexibility’ method which consists of establishing a
policy via protocols detailing in advance all aspects of the flexibility arrangement for that
particular area (option used for instance in the case of the European Monetary Union). This
technique implies however the convening of an IGC, the negotiation of new articles and/or
Protocols attached to the Treaties and a long round of national ratifications. Closer
cooperation requires none of these and, in that respect, offers a much lighter procedure for
differentiated subsidiarity.
1.2.2 Closer cooperation provides a useful intermediary solution
between unanimity and QMV
Argument: If decision-making is stalled in an area ruled by unanimity, closer cooperation
can overcome the blockage. In those areas or issues run by QMV, where actual voting is
unacceptable because of the sensitive nature of the specific issues involved, closer
cooperation could be a less brutal alternative.
Evaluation: Closer cooperation can indeed in some cases be a useful back-up option, both in
policy areas run by unanimity decision-making and in areas where QMV is the rule. In areas
run by unanimity, closer cooperation is a way to overcome blockages caused by
irreconciliable divergence of views. The flip side of this argument is that the existence of
closer cooperation undermines the case for QMV extension. In policy areas where unanimity
is paralysing and for which decision-makers see no alternative system but QMV, the pressure
to introduce QMV is of course very strong. That pressure will be potentially diffused by any
other option, closer cooperation in this instance, equally able to overcome blockages created
by unanimity (see 2.1.2).
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In those cases where QMV is the general rule, recourse to closer cooperation for specific
sensitive (sub-)policy areas could be less ‘traumatic’ than the use of QMV. Being repeatedly
outvoted in sensitive (sub-)areas might be particularly harsh for new CEE Member States, not
least because of the special symbolic value of a recently recaptured sovereignty. Moreover, it
is unlikely that much additional resources will be made available after enlargement to
‘smoothen’ the use of QMV, by providing the outvoted Member States with catch-up funds and
compensation for their adjustment costs. This being said, closer cooperation should only be
considered as a decision-making alternative in those cases where closer cooperations side-
effects – legal fragmentation and legal insecurity – are not prohibitive (e.g. excluding its use
in various areas linked with the internal market).
1.2.3 The Union needs safe ‘policy laboratories’
Argument: Closer cooperation can function as a ‘laboratory’ for the EU. Member States which
are willing and able to do so can ‘experiment with’ new policies and regimes which could
eventually be of interest for the entire Union. The other Member States can wait and see for
the first results, before deciding to join the experiment or not.
Evaluation: The main (successful) laboratories – the European Monetary System and
Schengen – have been initially established outside the Union. Even if the EU managed
eventually to secure their incorporation, it would have been safer to conduct these
experiments within the Union framework for reasons indicated below (see 1.2.6).
Considering the fact that such experiments could develop into EU-wide regimes, some sort of
endorsement is needed. The mandate required for a ‘laboratory’ does not obviously need to
be as strong as in the case of the designation of an official ‘nursery’ or a ‘vanguard’ group
stricto sensu. It does not indeed pre-commit non-participating Member States to accept the
result of the experiments. In that respect, unanimity is not an imperative and the legitimacy
of the laboratory seems to be sufficiently established by an authorisation to proceed given by
a qualified majority of the Member States. The participation of a majority of Member States
to closer cooperation brings with it extra-legitimacy which is non negligible. It might
therefore be preferable not to go below such a threshold. This threshold might furthermore
not be an insurmountable obstacle. Evidence tends to show that, for most policy areas
potentially concerned, it should not be a problem for the current Union. If the future might
be more uncertain, the next enlargement will bring several new Members willing to go
further in terms of integration.
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1.2.4 The Union needs a hard core and this core needs an institutional platform
Argument: The Union needs a core group of Member States – a pro-active sub-system
endowed with large resources – and closer cooperation could contribute to its constitution.
In areas where there is no clear functional spill-over (i.e. ‘a situation where the original goal
can be assured only by taking further actions’ – Lindberg) and where preferences of the
Member States strongly diverge, the only way to secure new integrative progress is to create a
‘noyau dur’ able to provide a strong leadership.
Evaluation: Sub-systems are part of the EC/EU since its origins (De Schoutheete 1990). A
‘centre de gravité’ made of pro-integrationist Member States could certainly give much
needed direction and vigour to the deepening of the Union, especially after enlargement, but
a formal core would be counterproductive. Abandoning the formal equality of Member States
would unleash a dynamic that could result in a directoire. New ways of forging and
expressing leadership might well be indispensable to avoid post-enlargement stagnation, but
they should remain fluid, diffuse and inclusive. We argued above that it is difficult to see how
closer cooperation could be an instrument of ‘hegemonic exclusion’ (see 1.1.4). The repeated
use of closer cooperation could however contribute to the emergence of an open group
providing valuable impulsion and coherence (Quermonne, Andréani and Dehove 1999).
1.2.5 Proper institution-building requires ‘safety valves’
Argument: Proper institution-building implies that the norms, principles, rules and
procedures are not only designed around existing issues. The regime would otherwise be very
quickly out of date. Effective institutions should be able to respond to a variety of situations
which cannot be foreseen at the time of the drafting of the Treaties and should therefore
possess general ‘safety valves’.
Evaluation: This major rule in institutional design is well established in the academic
literature. Besides, ‘safety valves’ or open-ended provisions have been long introduced in the
Treaties and proved their usefulness (TEC Article 308, ex-235). Closer cooperation clearly
belongs to the same category of instruments. Before welcoming it as a valuable contribution
to proper institution-building, it needs to be demonstrated that closer cooperation is the right
kind of safety valve, considering in particular the magnitude of the post-enlargement era
uncertainty. This evaluation will be conducted in the next section.
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1.2.6 The Union needs an alternative to extra-EU cooperation
Argument: Cooperation among Member States outside the EC/EU framework has become
problematic for the development of the Union. Closer cooperation provides a better
alternative to extra-EU cooperation.
Evaluation: Membership of the EC/EU does not exclude the possibility of two or more
Member States cooperating outside the EC/EU framework. Member States have, over the last
50 years, entered into bilateral and multilateral cooperations, among themselves as well as
with third states. These extra-EU cooperations having proven useful to deal with regional
and/or functional issues, there should be good reasons to plead for (intra-EU) closer
cooperation as an alternative.
A first and negative reason is the realization that extra-EU closer cooperation possesses
serious risks and problems. Following the example of the Schengen experiment, it could lead
to the multiplication of parallel and competing regimes, duplicating and emptying out
existing EC/EU policies, and contributing to the disintegration of the Community legal order.
More over, extra-EU closer cooperation suffers from a lack of transparency, a democratic
deficit (no parliamentary involvement) and the absence of independent judicial review. A
second and more positive reason is that intra-EU cooperation will bring precious advantages
to cooperating States and to the Union. Closer cooperation is a priori lowering transaction
costs for the cooperating states (they do not have to define new rules and establish new
structures, which is substantial). The main advantage for the Union is that, by opening its
institutions to European regional and functional subsystems, it is in a better position to work
on the coherence of the closer cooperation endeavours with EC/EU policies and rules, this at a
relatively modest cost thanks to economies of scale. Closer cooperation is also expected to be
more cohesive, since it guarantees the openness to small and medium Member States
(contrary to some extra-EU directoires). Globally speaking, the concept behind closer
cooperation offers therefore indeed in several cases a better and much needed alternative to
large and rivalling extra-EU cooperation.
1.3 Conclusions
Considering that it cannot be demonstrated that the existing EU ‘toolbox’ will suffice to deal
with diversity in a Union of 30 members; considering that the non-use of closer cooperation
so far is resulting from other reasons than its uselessness; considering that various domains
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have been identified as possible areas for the application of closer cooperation; considering
that closer cooperation is more centripetal than most other forms of flexibility; considering
that the risk of developing a hegemonic core through the use of closer cooperation is
reasonably well pre-empted by a number of conditions written in the Treaties; considering
that closer cooperation has been explicitly designed as an instrument of last resort and
should therefore not become a substitute for EU-wide cooperation; considering that the risk
to the acquis has probably been exaggerated; considering that closer cooperation should
contribute to the output-legitimacy of the EU; considering that closer cooperation is providing
a new form of subsidiarity under which some Member States stick to national solutions
whereas others choose to adopt sub-continental ones; considering that closer cooperation
offers a way to overcome irreconcilable divergence of views in those areas where QMV is not
(yet) acceptable; considering that closer cooperation provides safe settings for the ‘policy
laboratories’ needed by the Union; considering that a group engaging in all endeavours of
closer cooperation could provide valuable impulsion and coherence; considering that the
problem-solving capacity of the Union is a priori enhanced by the insertion of ‘safety valves’
in its institutional structure, able to preserve the integration momentum; and, finally,
considering that, for reasons of transparency, coherence and equity, it is in many cases
preferable to resort to intra-EU rather than extra-EU cooperation, the EU needs TEU Title VII
closer cooperation.
This instrument involves however a number of risks of different magnitude. In order to
address the most serious risks identified in section 1, the following things should be done.
The proposals for closer cooperation should be conceived in a fairly open way and
accompanied, if necessary, by adequate bridging mechanisms between the ins and outs. The
Commission should preserve as much as possible its image of impartiality, making clear that
it is not ‘taking side’ with a group of Member States against the others. The negative impact
of closer cooperation on the transparency and readibility of EC/EU activities should always be




2 DO THE PROVISIONS ON CLOSER COOPERATION
NEED TO BE REVISED?
2.1 Arguments against the revision
2.1.1 Incremental changes are preferable to Treaty changes
Argument: With its cumbersome and sometimes hazardous IGCs, the reform of the Treaties is
arduous, full of unintended consequences and, altogether, dispensable. Lighter (and
therefore safer) means are preferable to carry out the necessary adjustments to institutions
and decision-making procedures.
Evaluation: All in all, incremental reforms seem indeed to be easier to introduce, safer and
able to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the EU. It is however widely accepted that
they are often grossly insufficient to address the main source(s) of many political and
managerial problems of the Union. When compared for instance with federal states, the EU
displays a number of systemic handicaps or deficits which can only be met by radical reforms.
For instance, the number and strength of built-in blocking devices written in the Union
system are substantially superior to those in any large federal state (where, for instance, no
unit – besides rare cases of constitutional change – can veto a decision single-handedly, or
where absolute rather than 2/3 majority is the rule). The EU is also deprived of strong
centripetal levers like shared language, taxation and redistributive policies. If those deficits
cannot be addressed directly, other radical solutions, like closer cooperation, have to be
envisaged. The Union cannot do without Treaty changes.
2.1.2 Other Treaty changes like the extension of QMV must be given priority
Argument: Other Treaty changes, like the extension of QMV, should be given priority over the
revision of closer cooperation, since QMV is better for the Union.
Evaluation: QMV is, in some areas, the only functional solution. Extension of QMV and
revision of the closer cooperation provisions are not however always mutually exclusive and
should even be conceived as parallel strategies. A first reason for that parallelism is that some
policy areas, like social policy or social security of workers, might require both: QMV as a
general rule, with closer cooperation as a subsidiary option for highly sensitive and specific
28
sub-areas. There are clear indications there that, where (repeatedly) outvoting a minority of
Member States is potentially too ‘traumatic’, it might be preferable to refrain from resorting
to QMV and use closer cooperation instead (see 1.2.2). A second reason why closer
cooperation should be revised in parallel to QMV extension is that, in certain cases, there is
only a need for sub-systemic cooperation. Using QMV to impose functional/regional
endeavours of no interest for a number of Member States could be equally counterproductive.
In such situations, differentiated subsidiarity offers a better alternative (see 1.2.1). In order to
avoid high political costs in those policy sub-areas where majority voting is either too
sensitive, not indispensable or inopportune (not all of them being identifiable now), the
Union needs to have the choice between QMV and workable enabling clauses for closer
cooperation.
2.1.3 Revising the compromise of Amsterdam will only destroy its precious balance
Argument: Closer cooperation belongs to the category of package deals which should not be
reopened. The Amsterdam provisions are the expression of a carefully balanced compromise
and any change would destroy this delicate balance. In consequence, closer cooperation
should not be amended because it corresponds to a Pareto-optimum (that is, it is impossible
to make anyone better off without making someone worse off).
Evaluation: Rather than a delicate balance of the interests of the various parties, the
compromise reached in Amsterdam would be more adequately described as a formula
favouring very clearly proponents of the status quo. There is room for amendments that
could correct this imbalance. As to the feasibility of the revision, suffice to say that
governmental preferences are not static. As already mentioned, acclimatisation of Member
States to new mechanisms invariably require time. The learning process can also be
accelerated by the unfolding of new events like the fall of the Berlin wall or the imminence of
planned developments like the enlargement (see 3.2.3).
2.1.4 Relaxing the strict enabling conditions might threaten the basis of the Union
Argument: Relaxing the strict criteria with which closer cooperation must comply, might
threaten the basis of the Union or would at least increase the dangers listed above (see 1.1.4
to 1.1.9).
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Evaluation: The argument is more valid for certain criteria than for others. Relaxing for
instance the last resort criterion would lead to a fundamental departure from the Community
method. The willing and able could then be tempted by the easiest option, saving themselves
the trouble of having to struggle to find a common solution with the other Member States. A
recurrence of this pattern would lead to an erosion of solidarity among Member States,
especially if no bridging mechanisms were built between the closer cooperation group and
the unable Member States. Another dangerous development would be to relax the condition
about the acquis communautaire (by stipulating for instance that the acquis should not be
affected ‘adversely’ or ‘significantly’), considering the legal insecurity this could introduce. On
the other hand, the maximalist wording of a number of the criteria can be adjusted without
endangering the values discussed in section 1 (for concrete revision proposals, see 2.2.1).
2.1.5 The provisions on closer cooperation have to be put to the test first
Argument: The provisions on closer cooperation have to be put to the test first. A revision
should be envisaged on that basis only.
Evaluation: The literature on public policy analysis distinguishes between ex-ante and ex-
post evaluation. A study of the design is sometimes sufficient to identify a number of
unsurmountable shortcomings or flaws. In other words, there is no need to throw an ostrich
from an aeroplane to know that it cannot fly. The evaluation of several arguments presented
in section 1 and in sub-section 2.2 points at a number of constraints which limit dramatically
the workability of closer cooperation.
2.2 Arguments in favour of revision
2.2.1 The features of closer cooperation are so defensive that the mechanism is unworkable
Argument: The most common assessment is that the features of closer cooperation are so
defensive that the mechanism is unworkable in practice. They put, from the point of view of
effectiveness and functionality, a number of highly damageable constraints on the group
cooperating more closely. It is above all unacceptable that the activation of closer cooperation
can be blocked as a consequence of the veto of a single Member State. The set of enabling
conditions imposed on closer cooperation is unduly restrictive. Moreover, the closer
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cooperation group has too little or insufficient control of what it can do (compared for
instance with the liberty enjoyed by the Schengen group, when it started in 1985).
Evaluation: Besides non-conflicting situations, closer cooperation is certainly not fully
operational. The objective of the 1996 IGC, i.e. designing a form a ‘structured flexibility’ to
increase the problem-solving capacity of the Union, has not been met because of a number of
constraining features. Some of these features are nevertheless indispensable to protect the
achievements and core values of the European Union (see 2.1.4). This applies certainly to the
presence and involvement of the supranational institutions in the closer cooperation
procedures. They may represent a limitation for the closer cooperation group (compared with
the Schengen-model) but are vital to preserve the coherence and democratic legitimacy of the
ensemble. Other conditions currently laid down by the Treaties for the establishment of
closer cooperation could however be changed without endangering the achievements and
values of the EU.
The first change should concern the triggering procedure. The necessity to protect legitimate
national interests is the main argument invoked to justify the possibility given to each
Member State to veto the activation of closer cooperation. Once the draconian conditions set
by the Treaties have been objectively fulfilled and the present and future interests of non
participants states are safeguarded, once the Commission has the power for the first pillar to
block any project of closer cooperation by not proposing it, once Member States have the
possibility to become parties to the cooperation from the outset or at any other time they
wish, once expenditure resulting from implementation of the cooperation is borne by the
participating Member States, there is however no solid justification left for the maintenance
of the veto, except perhaps the question of the absence of solidarity mechanisms. Supposing
that this question could be solved (through Treaty revision or not), the veto would then
primarily offer the possibility for a Member State to establish illegitimate linkages between
the authorisation of closer cooperation and other topics. No progress would have then been
achieved by comparison with the current state of affairs in the Union. The activation of closer
cooperation by QMV is of course not a guarantee against such practices, but at least would be
less costly for the willing and able Member States. They would indeed have, in the worst
cases, to buy-off only the votes needed to reach a qualified majority. The most important
element in the revision is therefore a priori the suppression of the veto over the activation of
the process. The authorisation of closer cooperation should be granted by qualified majority.
The unanimous decision of the European Council should be replaced by another type of
‘emergency brakes’. A Member State would keep the right to suspend the vote for a limited
period of time. The Member State would have to refer explicitly to important reasons of
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national policy. The Commission would have the obligation to examine these reasons within
for instance three months. For the first pillar, the Commission would then decide on the basis
of its assessment whether the procedure should resume or not. For the third pillar, the
Commission would only give an opinion, the Council having then to decide by QMV if the
procedure should resume or not. In the affirmative, the Council would take a final vote on the
authorisation by a qualified majority. This amendment would improve dramatically the
workability of closer cooperation while preserving a sufficient level of reassurance for
Member States likely to decline participation.
A second change concerns the unduly restrictive criteria referring to the interests of non-
participant Members States and the distortion of competition. The criterion requiring that
closer cooperation “… does not affect the competences, rights, obligations, and interests of
those Member States which do not participate therein” should be adapted so as to stipulate
that closer cooperation does not “significantly affect (…) interests of those Member States…”.
In the same way, the very restrictive “…does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of
trade between Member States and does not distort the conditions of competition between the
latter” should be changed into “…does not significantly …”. Perhaps more tentatively, the
wording of the condition referring to Community policies, actions or programmes could
equally be revised. Reopening this issue is however not without risk. If the proposal is
rejected by at the end of the IGC 2000 or any subsequent IGC, the Courts could be obliged to
interpret the provisions in a very restrictive way. It could indeed be said then that there is no
ambiguity about the intention of the Constituents who discussed explicitly the wording of the
article and refused to revise it.
2.2.2 A group engaging in closer cooperation needs more control over its size and the pace
of its expansion
Argument: The best way to develop quickly and efficiently new regimes is to start with a
group of like-minded states. The necessary degree of cohesion often means that the initial
group will be small. Member States envisaging the development of closer cooperation have
too little control over the initial size of the group and the pace of its expansion. Closer
cooperation must be allowed to start on a smaller scale if necessary. Member States must be
freer to decide which among non participants can join and when.
Evaluation: On one side, the academic literature offers solid empirical evidence about the
negative impact of an all inclusive approach on the development of international regimes.
32
The best example being the comparison of what the EC and other regional or international
organisations have achieved over the same period. A high number of participants can be
dysfunctional. Stipulating that closer cooperation is open to all Member States and must
concern at least a majority of them will soon be synonymous with large starting groups (cf.
the Euro-zone). Closer cooperation would then have reduced the size problem to some
extent, but not have solved it. On the other side, openness is a vital element in the
development of the EU for reasons mentioned supra and this principle should not be
modified.
There is however one way to address the problem of the size, which does not affect the
openness of the system: the revision of the minimum number of Member States needed to set
up closer cooperation. A distinction could indeed be introduced between closer cooperation
aiming at developing regimes which could eventually be of interest to the entire Union
(‘laboratory’ closer cooperation) and closer cooperation of smaller ambition, whose object
concerns only a group of Member States, for instance on specific environmental problems
(‘large sub-systemic’ closer cooperation). As discussed supra (see 1.2.3) it might be preferable
to maintain, for reasons of legitimacy, the obligation to involve at least a majority of Member
States in any ‘laboratory closer cooperation’. Considering the more limited ambition of a
‘large sub-systemic’ closer cooperation, there is no need for such a majority.
The threshold for ‘large sub-systemic’ closer cooperation could very well be lowered to some
extent. It should not be too low in order to avoid the risk of overloading the Union with
management tasks. This form of closer cooperation in particular should also remain an
option for the Member States, not an obligation. The underlying idea is the preservation of
the interests of the current Member States, which should not be deprived of a cooperative
framework for having accepted to accelerate the pace of enlargement on (justified) political
ground. Opening such an opportunity to a relatively small number of Member States can be
equally beneficial for the EU as suggested by the following comparison with federal systems.
Operating in a state system, federal institutions are in a relatively good position to monitor
and, if needed, sanction the activities of the federate units, including their
‘intergovernmental’ relations (i.e. relations developed among themselves). Among other
reasons, it does so to maintain or increase the coherence of the activities pursued by different
and partially autonomous levels of power. The same objective can be reached through ‘mixed’
programmes designed or endorsed by the federal level, inviting federate states to join on a
voluntary basis and pooling some resources with them. Considering that the Union is poorly
equipped for a corrective and coercive approach, the preference should be given to some form
of positive engagement preventing the development of cooperations potentially damageable
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outside its framework. In that respect there is some analogy between EU’s closer cooperation
and ‘mixed’ programmes.
To sum up, the openness of closer cooperation should be preserved. A distinction could be
introduced between ‘laboratory closer cooperation’ and ‘large sub-systemic closer
cooperation’. The threshold for the latter could be lowered, as proposed by the European
Commission, to a third of the Members States.
2.2.3 The second pillar needs ‘structural flexibility’
Argument: The Union needs an instrument to curb the multiplication of ad hoc closer
cooperation outside the Treaty at the expense of the second pillar structures. 'Structural
flexibility' would be particularly useful in the field of defence and for the incorporation of the
Western European Union. It would provide a possible framework for the development of a
common regime for armaments which is hampered by the current multi-track approach to
cooperation combining an extra-EU dimension through ad hoc and institutionalized
mechanisms (such as the Organization of Cooperation in armaments and the European
Armaments Group, part of the WEU, respectively), with a much weaker intra-EU dimension
(the working group for armament policy POLARM).
Evaluation: The argument is certainly defendable, especially for armaments cooperation. On
the other hand, for some, the second pillar is already highly flexible. Any addition could well
be counter-productive in terms of the objectives of visibility, continuity and coherence. It is,
in particular, very difficult to divide external policy on big issues. The use of a single
institutional framework to conduct non-EU actions of foreign policy could also be a potential
source of confusion with third countries non necessarily aware of the subtleties of the
European game or ready to accept it. This would be particularly problematic for neutral and
nonaligned Member States. Finally, the CFSP might gain little credibility from hosting a
number of variable Directoires. Valid arguments in favour of and against the extension of
closer cooperation to the second pillar tend to balance each other. The possible benefits of
closer cooperation in armaments could however slightly tilt the balance in favour of the
extension.
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2.2.4 Exaggerated transparency will impede closer cooperation’s efficiency
Argument: Closer cooperation will suffer from an overdose of transparency. The fact that the
closer cooperation deliberations are open to non-participating Member States deprives the
group of the confidentiality and intimacy needed for its proper development (cf. Deubner
1999).
Evaluation: The transparency of closer cooperation might indeed affect to some extent its
efficiency. While the ‘pre-ins’ – that is, Member States willing to join closer cooperation but
temporarily unable to do so – are likely to adopt a more co-operative attitude, they might be
tempted to slow down the process in order to facilitate their accession. The ‘outs’ or unwilling
might try to derail closer cooperation endeavours because of their sectoral interests and/or
because they are in principle opposed to the deepening of the European integration. The
involvement of non-participating Member States is however justified by the necessity to
prevent the formation of exclusive groupings and preserve the coherence of the Union as a
whole. It is furthermore legitimated by the fact that closer cooperation might affect the
interests of non-participants, their presence providing a relatively cheap early warning
system at that level. The involvement of the pre-ins is possibly even more legitimate
considering that they are committed to the objectives of closer cooperation and will
eventually live by its rules. Without this openness, closer cooperation would be a much less
safe mechanism for the Union. The potential loss of efficiency should therefore be considered
as a price worth paying. The right to participate to deliberations should not be suppressed or
amended.
2.2.5 Solidarity mechanisms must be inserted in the provisions on closer cooperation
Argument: The provisions on closer cooperation make no reference to any solidarity
mechanism. In order to preserve the cohesion of the Union, a commitment to solidarity
should be inserted in the Treaties.
Evaluation: The absence of reference to solidarity mechanisms in the Treaty of Amsterdam
has indeed contributed to the impression that closer cooperation is a tool of exclusion. If
self-help should not be ruled out, it should not be (indirectly) presented as the only
‘catching-up’ approach either. A general commitment to assist, where and when appropriate,
the Member States which are willing but unable to participate in closer cooperation should be
taken. This would better guarantee the cohesion of the Union and remove the most valid
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raison d’être of the so-called ‘emergency brakes’ (see above 1.1.5). This major concession
made to the ‘unable’ should therefore go hand in hand with the relinquishment of the
possibility of vetoing the authorisation of closer cooperation.
2.2.6 The status of the acquis of closer cooperation needs to be clarified
Argument: The provisions on closer cooperation give no indication on the status of the closer
cooperation’s acquis. Either this acquis is not part of the Union’s acquis and a majority of
Member States willing to develop the acquis of the Union is not fully aware that it makes a
much bigger concession than a classical opt-out (the United Kingdom and Denmark got, for
instance, the right to choose not to join the third phase of the monetary Union, but accepted
in return that this phase will be an integral part of the Union’s acquis). Or closer
cooperation’s acquis is part of the Union’s acquis and some Member States will authorize
closer cooperation without being fully aware of the consequences of their vote (i.e. that they
give a kind of mandate to the group forging ahead, or at least that they accept the idea of the
‘nursery’). Filing that omission would therefore be an important element of clarification.
Evaluation: There is indubitably an ambiguity over the status of closer cooperation’s acquis.
The question does not however need to be addressed immediately. It could even be argued
that this ambiguity plays a constructive role, allowing the Union to move forward and wait for
better circumstances to take the final decision. The question will become more urgent as soon
as the first authorisation of closer cooperation will be given (supposing that this will happen
before the accession of the last candidate for membership of the Union). The Union will
indeed have to clarify whether candidate Member States have to adopt the acquis of closer
cooperation or not.
2.2.7 The treaties should specify how and when closer cooperation comes to an end
Argument: The treaties do not specify how and when closer cooperation comes to an end. It
is preferable to agree on the procedures now rather than having to improvise on the basis of
the specifics of the first case.
Evaluation: Largely technical and formal, this aspect could nevertheless pose a number of
problems linked with the question of the status of closer cooperation’s acquis. If the
accession of the last non-participating Member State is considered as putting automatically
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an end to closer cooperation, the solution for the incorporation of an acquis fully endorsed by
all should be rather straight and simple. Other approaches to the question might prove to be
more problematic. Once a group cooperating more closely represents a qualified majority in
the Council, it might want to pursue its activities in the normal EC/EU framework. Provided of
course that the policy area is not ruled by unanimity, this group could use its voting power to
dissolve itself and decide to transform the acquis of the closer cooperation into ‘plain’ EC/EU
acquis. Such considerations are for the moment highly speculative. It would however be
useful to discuss the question and define the modalities of these possible transfers.
2.3 Conclusions
Considering that Treaty change is the only way to deal with some of the systemic problems of
the Union; considering that the current compromise is clearly biased in favour of the
proponents of the status quo; considering that the mechanism can be made more effective
without endangering the basis of the Union, especially in the case of ‘sub-systemic’ closer
cooperation; considering that the current provisions are not sufficiently attractive to
discourage the use of extra-EU cooperation; considering that structural flexibility could be
beneficial for parts of the second pillar; considering that the insertion of a general
commitment to solidarity in the provisions would better guarantee the cohesion of the Union
and remove the most valid raison d’être of the ‘emergency brakes’; and, finally, considering
that the status of the cc acquis will have to be clarified as soon as the first authorisation of cc
will be given, the provisions for closer cooperation need to be revised.
In order to protect the democratic legitimacy and cohesion of the Union, the solidarity
between the Member States as well as the interests of the lighter-weight Member States, the
following features of the actual mechanism should be preserved: instrument of ‘last resort’;
presence and involvement of the supranational institutions; principle of the open-door;
involvement of non-participating Member States. Moreover, the revision of closer
cooperation should not distract the Union from the necessary extension of the scope of QMV.
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3 DO THE PROVISIONS ON CLOSER COOPERATION
NEED TO BE REVISED NOW?
3.1 Arguments against the immediate revision of the clauses
on closer cooperation
3.1.1 The revision of closer cooperation will jeopardize the timetable of the enlargement
Argument: The revision of the provisions on closer cooperation will jeopardize the timetable
of the enlargement. Putting this point on the agenda will slow down or possibly stall the IGC
2000. The impossibility to conclude the IGC before the end of the year 2000 will have a
damaging knock-on effect on enlargement.
Evaluation: This argument is rather weak for four reasons. Primo, there is a tendency to
(fore)see each IGC through the lenses of the previous one. The anti-Maastricht backlash was
largely interpreted as the result of a deficit of information over the 1991 IGC and a particular
effort of transparency was made in 1996-7. Similarly, the criticisms over the number of points
dealt in Amsterdam is leading today to overfocus on the question of the length of the IGC’s
agenda. If the simultaneous negotiation of several dozen items may indeed have led to
sub-optimal results, the view that putting more than three topics on the agenda would be
damageable is going to another extreme. Secundo, closer cooperation is no longer a new
concept. Having been already debated and studied extensively, its renegotiation could a
priori be much faster than its initial negotiation. Tertio, the validity of the argument rests on
the assumption that an entire IGC can be blocked. Past record indicates that, for various
reasons, this probability is very small. Quatro, as no firm date has been set for the first
accession and the most difficult chapters of the acquis have yet to be opened, it is impossible
at this stage to say if a delay of a couple of months for the conclusion of the IGC would make
any difference for the enlargement timetable.
3.1.2 There is no practical need to rush the revision of closer cooperation
Argument: The Union of 15 can develop without a workable closer cooperation. This
mechanism is not going to be necessary either to cope with the first wave of accession. The
frontrunners among the candidate Member States are indeed catching up quickly and have
approximately 10 more years to complete the ‘absorption’ of the acquis (5 years before their
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actual accession to be followed by minimum 5 years of transition periods). An imperative
need for extra capacity of diversity management will only arise when the Union will be
confronted with the second round of enlargement, that is not before 2010. It is therefore
possible to organise in the meantime another negotiation on the Treaties, allowing to spread
the agenda of radical institutional changes over two IGC s (cf. Attali 1999).
Evaluation: A number of arguments presented in favour of closer cooperation and its
revision tend to challenge the first proposition. As to the second, it is very difficult, if not
impossible at this stage, to demonstrate that the first round of enlargement will not require
the use of closer cooperation. The idea of a succession of IGC s – for instance in 2000 and
2005 – is tenable but represents a gamble the Union does not have to take.
3.1.3 The radical reform of the institutions in the immediate run-up to the enlargement
is unfair
Argument: The radical reform of the institutions in the immediate run-up to the first
enlargement is illegitimate, improper and/or politically counterproductive. The future
Member States – or at least the frontrunners – have a right to have a say in the redefinition of
institutions they are about to adopt. By changing the rules just prior to their accession, the
Union would send the wrong message to all candidate Member States, reinforcing their fear
of exclusion. Incidentally, it would steal the perspective (or break the indirect promise) of
participation to the big EU institutional redesign made to the most advanced candidates (cf.
Protocol on the institutions with the prospects of enlargement of the EU, annexed to the
Treaty of Amsterdam).
Evaluation: The right to participate to the Treaties reform is one of the most important
benefits attached to (full) membership. Keeping a clear demarcation between the ‘ins’ and the
‘outs’, together with the full acceptance of an acquis established by others, has clearly played
a key part in the attraction exerted by the Union on its periphery. On that ground and others,
reforming the Treaties should remain an exclusively intra-EU process. As to the ‘suspicious’
timing of the reform, it is a long-established feature of the Community methodology. Most
previous enlargements have been also preceded by a raft of policy and/or institutional
changes. Some have generated more frustration and impression of EU diktat than others.
What would be in fact illegitimate and counterproductive is the introduction of last minute
discriminatory rules targeting applicant Member States. If new solutions are not seen as
reasonably fair and balanced, if they create ‘structural losers’, they will indeed almost
39
certainly lead to blockages aimed at starting a renegotiation immediately after accession. In
conclusion, the radical reform of the institutions in the immediate run-up to the enlargement
is not in itself illegitimate or unethical. Provided that the reforms are sufficiently ‘fair’, they
can be designed prior to the first accessions without being counterproductive. As to the
‘broken promise’, it is true that the decision to hold an IGC before the accession of the most
advanced candidates can be disappointing, but a relatively minor one. The perspective of a
participation in this negotiation is of course not what motivates their huge efforts of
adjustment to speed up their accession.
3.2 Arguments in favour of the immediate revision of the clauses
on closer cooperation
3.2.1 The IGC 2000 is most probably the last conference before EU membership
exceeds twenty
Argument: The Member States have the legal obligation to convene an intergovernmental
conference “in order to carry out a comprehensive review of the provisions of the Treaties on
the composition and functioning of the institutions” at least one year before the membership
of the EU exceeds twenty (Protocol on the institutions with the prospects of enlargement of
the EU, annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam). The number of candidates likely to be part of
the first round of enlargement is now over five. Insofar as these accessions are likely to take
place between 2003 and 2005, the IGC 2000 is most probably the only conference which can
be convened before the EU reaches 21 Member States.
Evaluation: From a political point of view, this argument is legalistic and resting on a
partially arbitrary definition of the determinant threshold. The EU leaders have indeed put
that obligation upon themselves. If they reckon that the timetable envisaged in Amsterdam
has indeed been telescoped by events, the IGC 2000 is giving them the opportunity to revise
the obligation and the calendar. Furthermore, they have not demonstrated why it would be
impossible or significantly more damaging for the Union to convene a conference before it
reaches 22 or 23 rather than 21 members. Because of these two weaknesses, the protocol is
politically and intellectually speaking not a very convincing basis to argue in favour of the
immediate revision of the treaties.
40
3.2.2 Widening the agenda of the IGC 2000 will facilitate its successful conclusion
Argument: The result of an IGC depends, among other things, on the possibility for Member
States to exchange concessions and build a package-deal. An agenda consisting of the three
so-called ‘left-overs’ of Amsterdam (size and composition of the Commission, weighting of
votes in the Council and extension of QMV in the Council) limits too drastically the possible
configurations of mutual concessions. In that respect, closer cooperation is providing a useful
addition to the agenda defined by the Cologne European Council of June 1999.
Evaluation: The first part of the proposition is a view widely endorsed in the academic
literature. Enlarging the agenda will not however automatically facilitate the negotiation (for
instance, if a Member State favours the status quo on all issues at stake, the addition of topics
for which it has no interest will not help). In the present case, it is difficult to see how closer
cooperation could contribute to reach a compromise on the question of the Commissioners
and the weighting of votes in the Council. It could, on the contrary, be part of a solution on
the extension of QMV. This argument should therefore be considered as potentially valid.
3.2.3 The IGC 2000 offers a unique window of opportunity for the revision of closer
cooperation
Argument: During the 1996-7 IGC, the concept of closer cooperation was mainly opposed by
two groups of governments: one worried by the perspective of further (unwanted) European
integration; the other by the perspective of being unable to join the avant-garde or excluded
by it. Three years later, the mechanism introduced in Amsterdam seems at least officially
better accepted in a very large majority of Member States. Following a change of government
or thanks to an evolution of their public opinion, reluctant Member States are less unwilling
(Denmark, Greece, Sweden and the United Kingdom). After their inclusion in the Euro-zone
and the Schengen area, the opponents of the other group have been partially reassured about
their capacity to join any closer cooperation if they wish so (Spain, Portugal and, to a lesser
extent, Greece). The perspective of the accession of less developed Member States is another
factor of reassurance for them. All in all, the IGC 2000 should therefore offer a unique
window of opportunity for the revision of closer cooperation.
Evaluation: It is difficult to say exactly how deep the acceptance of closer cooperation is
today. As long as the triggering procedure and the enabling conditions remain what they are,
there is indeed no need for a government to manifest publicly its opposition to a principle
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whose application is so constrained. Reservations about the mechanism seem however to
have diminished, especially in many line or technical Ministries, but they certainly have not
evaporated. One could therefore agree that there is a window of opportunity for closer
cooperation’s revision, yet not a big one. The options to force a breakthrough on the issue are
indeed equally difficult: proponents of the revision manage either to convince intellectually
the other governments of the intrinsic merits of closer cooperation, or to find a trade-off able
to convince the opponents to come back on the very good deal they got in Amsterdam. The
window of opportunity is not only rather narrow, it is also relatively volatile. For instance,
Greece might be reassured by the fact that it is poised to become a full member of the
Schengen area later in 2000 and of the Euro-zone early 2001, however this still has to take
place. Its government might also be less anxious to be circumvented, for instance, on Turkey
related issues, considering recent bilateral rapprochement and multilateral development.
These progresses remain however very fragile. In the UK, the Euro-sceptic surge led by the
conservative party during the 1999 European elections and the perspective of the next
general election in 2002 are putting the Labour government in a defensive position vis-à-vis
all new integrationist developments. One cannot be totally sure that the tensions resulting
from the participation of the Freedom party to the Austrian government will have no knock-
on effect on the IGC.
If the Member States do not revise closer cooperation during the IGC 2000, there is a priori
very little short or medium term alternative to do so. If current Member States cannot be
reassured over the issue of exclusion, it is hard to see how, even in a well functioning Union,
this could be achieved before long with new and less developed Member States. If the next
enlargement brings in additional problems and protracted blockages, antagonism will raise
and solidarity will decrease. It would then be even more difficult to believe that a Union
producing less cohesion but within which Treaty changes require unanimity, could agree on
radical reforms anymore. There is therefore a real urgency to act now.
3.2.4 Transforming closer cooperation into a workable device is a precondition
for any enlargement
Argument: “Substantial progress towards reinforcing the institutions” is a precondition for
any enlargement (declaration by Belgium, France and Italy on the Protocol on the
institutions with the prospects of enlargement of the EU – annexed to the ToA). Insofar as
closer cooperation is an indispensable element of the reinforcement of the institutions, its
revision must take place before the first accession.
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Evaluation: In the absolute, preventive action is always desirable. It becomes indispensable
when the development envisaged does not enjoy a strong support. Though EU
decision-makers usually do not go beyond questioning the pace of enlargement, public
opinions in a majority of Member States express their opposition to the process altogether.
With such a background, all efforts must be made to avoid disruption, in the interest of the
Union but also to avoid a backlash against future Member States. The option of reforming the
Union substantially before the first accession is not only preferable, but most probably also
easier. Having to find a satisfactory solution for 15 or for 20 Member States is rarely
indifferent. In the present case, it cannot be said that none of the five frontrunners envisaged
at the time of Amsterdam (Hungary, Czech Republic, Slovenia, Poland and Estonia) will
bring new forms of problematic diversity in the Union. From an integrationist point of view,
members of this group could well affect negatively the course and pace of the reforms of the
Union, if involved in the IGC (be it because of a strict interpretation of their national
sovereignty, a willingness to come back on aspects of the accession deal, etc.). As far as closer
cooperation is concerned, their participation would almost certainly complicate significantly
the situation for reasons mentioned supra. In terms of risk management and feasibility, the
attempt to revise closer cooperation should take place before the first accession.
3.3 Conclusions
Considering that it is unlikely that the revision of closer cooperation could alter significantly
the enlargement timetable; considering that it is very difficult at this stage to demonstrate
that the first round of enlargement will not require the use of closer cooperation; considering
that it is legitimate and not necessarily counter-productive for the current Member States to
proceed with a radical reform of the institutions of the Union in the immediate run-up to the
first round of enlargement; considering that the widening of the agenda of the IGC 2000 to
closer cooperation might facilitate to some extent its successful conclusion; considering that
the IGC 2000 offers a unique (although narrow and volatile) window of opportunity for the
revision of closer cooperation; and, finally, considering that it is preferable (in terms of risk
management) and easier to revise closer cooperation before the first accessions, the revision
of the provisions on closer cooperation should be on the agenda of the IGC 2000.
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4 RECOMMENDATIONS
The arguments, evaluations and intermediary conclusions presented in the previous sections
lead to a number of general and specific recommendations. The general recommendations
can be summarised as follows:
1. the Union needs a safe and workable mechanism allowing Member States to develop
closer cooperation inside the institutional framework laid down by the Treaties, if it is to
solve in a satisfactory manner a number of difficult problems linked with its growing
diversity;
2. the workability of the current mechanism needs to be substantially improved;
3. the risks resulting from this improvement must be minimized by preserving a number of
indispensable safeguards already written in the Treaties;
4. this improvement should not distract the Union from the necessary extension of the
scope of qualified majority voting;
5. the interest of the Union is to revise the mechanism for closer cooperation as soon as
possible.
The specific recommendations concern exclusively the revisions which should be on the
agenda of the IGC 2000. They focus mainly on procedural and material elements of the
provisions on ‘closer cooperation’, proposing amendments and additions. Features not
discussed below are considered as sufficiently operational or indispensable safety devices.
The same and straight recommendation applies to all of these: the formulation agreed in
Amsterdam should be preserved. Eight specific recommendations can be deduced from our
analysis of the pros and cons of closer cooperation:
6. Recommendation on the triggering procedure. The authorisation of closer cooperation
should be granted by qualified majority. No single Member State should have the
possibility to veto the activation. The unanimous decision of the European Council should
be replaced by another type of ‘emergency brake’. A Member State would keep the right to
suspend the vote for a limited period of time. The Member State would have to refer
explicitly to important reasons of national policy. The Commission would have the
obligation to examine these reasons within for instance three months. For the first pillar,
the Commission would then decide on the basis of its assessment whether the procedure
should resume or not. For the third pillar, the Commission would only give an opinion,
the Council having then to decide by QMV if the procedure should resume or not. In the
affirmative, the Council would take a final vote on the authorisation by a qualified
majority. This amendment would improve dramatically the workability of closer
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cooperation while preserving a sufficient level of reassurance for Member States likely to
decline participation.
7. Recommendation on the minimum number of Member States needed to set up closer
cooperation. Generally speaking, as far as the final number of members of the Union is
not known, percentages are preferable to absolute figures. A ‘laboratory’ closer
cooperation – i.e. aiming at developing regimes which could eventually be of interest to
the entire Union – should concern at least a majority of Member States, to reinforce its
legitimacy. Considering the more limited ambition of a ‘large sub-systemic’ closer
cooperation – i.e. focusing on a topic interesting only a group of Member States –, for
instance on specific environmental problems, there is no need for such a majority. The
threshold for such closer cooperation could be lowered, as proposed by the European
Commission, to a third of the Member States. If need be, cooperations initially intended
and started as ‘large sub-systemic closer cooperation’ could be upgraded to ‘laboratory
closer cooperation’. Member States participating in a closer cooperation whose
membership is over the majority threshold should have the possibility of requesting an
upgrading vote to be taken by a qualified majority in the Council.
8. Recommendation on the coordination between different groups cooperating more
closely. There is no specific provision on the coordination among groups engaged in a
closer cooperation. The horizontal coordination of sectoral policies at EC/EU level is a
function performed by the General Affairs Council (GAC) and the Coreper. If the
memberships of the groups cooperating more closely are not identical, there will be no
equivalent for the GAC and the Coreper. This question is certainly not urgent and a priori
relatively minor for different reasons: closer cooperation is not meant to be used
extensively; the fact that some Member States are likely to participate to all closer
cooperation should help to prevent major problems of coordination; and, last but not
least, the Commission will be necessarily closely involved in all cases of closer
cooperation. The problem might however be aggravated by lowering the minimum
number of Member States needed to set up closer cooperation. It might indeed lead to
cases where there is little or even no membership overlapping. The solution could be to
simply rely on the Commission and consider that this question is part of its general
mission with regard to coordination, cohesion and coherence within the Union. If the
Member States reckon that the solution needs to be formalized, it does not have to be
defined in the Treaties.
9. Recommendation on the material conditions constraining the authorisation and use of
closer cooperation. The maximalist wording of a number of enabling conditions is unduly
restrictive at least when referring to the interests of non-participant Members States and
the distortion of competition. The Treaties should only stipulate that closer cooperation
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cannot affect ‘significantly’ the interests of non-participants and distort the conditions of
competition, or ‘prejudice’ Community policies, actions or programmes. The revision of
the condition regarding the acquis communautaire, stipulating for instance that closer
cooperation cannot affect the latter ‘adversely’, might be more problematic.
10. Recommendation on the extension of closer cooperation to the second pillar. There are
many valid arguments both in favour of and against the extension of closer cooperation to
the second pillar. The possible benefits of closer cooperation in armaments could
however be seen as a decisive argument in favour of the extension.
11. Recommendation on the inclusion of solidarity mechanisms in the provisions on closer
cooperation. The absence of reference to solidarity mechanisms in the Treaty of
Amsterdam has contributed to the impression that closer cooperation is a tool of
exclusion. Self-help should not be ruled out, but should not be (indirectly) presented as
the only ‘catching-up’ approach either. A general commitment to help, where and when
appropriate, the Members States which are willing but unable to participate in closer
cooperation should be inserted in the Treaties.
12. Recommendation on the definition of the status of the acquis resulting from closer
cooperation. The provisions on closer cooperation give no indication on the status of the
closer cooperation’s acquis. Coming back on that omission would be an important
element of clarification for reasons exposed supra (see section 2.2.6), even if the current
ambiguity should be seen as playing a constructive role. The question will however
become more urgent as soon as the first authorisation of closer cooperation will be given.
The Union will indeed have to indicate then to candidate Member States if the acquis of
closer cooperation is part of what they have to accept or not.
13. Recommendation on how and when to put an end to a closer cooperation. The Treaties
do not specify how and when closer cooperation comes to an end. Largely technical and
formal, this aspect could pose a number of problems linked with the question of the
status of the closer cooperation’s acquis (see 2.2.6). Such considerations are for the
moment highly speculative. It would however be useful to discuss the question and define
the modalities of these possible transfers.
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5 ANNEX: PROVISIONS ON CLOSER COOPERATION IN THE TEU AND TEC
Treaty on European Union - Title VII. Provisions on closer cooperation
Article 43
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may
make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by the Treaty and
the Treaty establishing the European Community provided that the cooperation:
(a) is aimed at furthering the objectives of the Union and at protecting and
serving its interests;
(b) respects the principles of the said Treaties and the single institutional
framework of the Union;
(c) is only used as a last resort, where the objectives of the said Treaties could not
be attained by applying the relevant procedures laid down therein;
(d) concerns at least a majority of Member States;
(e) does not affect the "acquis communautaire" and the measures adopted under
the other provisions of the said Treaties;
(f) does not affect the competences, rights, obligations and interests of those
Member States which do not participate therein;
(g) is open to all Member States and allows them to become parties to the
cooperation at any time, provided that they comply with the basic decision and
with the decisions taken within that framework;
(h) complies with the specific additional criteria laid down in Article 5a of the
Treaty establishing the European Community and Article K.12 of this Treaty,
depending on the area concerned and is authorised by the Council in
accordance with the procedures laid down therein.
2. Member States shall apply, as far as they are concerned, the acts and decisions
adopted for the implementation of the cooperation in which they participate. Member
States not participating in such cooperation shall not impede the implementation
thereof by the participating Member States.
Article 44
1. For the purposes of the adoption of the acts and decisions necessary for the
implementation of the cooperation referred to in Article K.15, the relevant
institutional provisions of this Treaty and of the Treaty establishing the European
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Community shall apply. However, while all members of the Council shall be able to
take part in the deliberations, only those representing participating Member States
shall take part in the adoption of decisions. The qualified majority shall be defined as
the same proportion of the weighted votes of the Council members concerned as laid
down in Article 148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community.
Unanimity shall be constituted by only those Council members concerned.
2. Expenditure resulting from implementation of the cooperation, other than
administrative costs entailed for the institutions, shall be borne by the participating
Member States, unless the Council, acting unanimously, decides otherwise.
Article 45
The Council and the Commission shall regularly inform the European Parliament of the
development of closer cooperation established on the basis of this Title.
Treaty establishing the European Community
Article 11
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may
be authorised, subject to Articles K.15 and K.16 of the Treaty on European Union, to
make use of the institutions, procedures and mechanisms laid down by this Treaty,
provided that the cooperation proposed:
(a) does not concern areas which fall within the exclusive competence of the
Community;
(b) does not affect Community policies, actions or programmes;
(c) does not concern the citizenship of the Union or discriminate between nationals of
Member States;
(d) remains within the limits of the powers conferred upon the Community by this
Treaty; and
(e) does not constitute a discrimination or a restriction of trade between Member
States and does not distort the conditions of competition between the latter.
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by
a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the
European Parliament.
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national
policy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a
vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that
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the matter be referred to the Council, meeting in the composition of the Heads of
State and Government, for decision by unanimity.
Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation as referred to in
paragraph 1 may address a request to the Commission, which may submit a proposal
to the Council to that effect. In the event of the Commission not submitting a
proposal, it shall inform the Member States concerned of the reasons for not doing so.
3. Any Member State which wishes to become a party to cooperation set up in
accordance with this Article shall notify its intention to the Council and to the
Commission, which shall give an opinion to the Council within three months of
receipt of that notification. Within four months of the date of that notification, the
Commission shall decide on it and on such specific arrangements as it may deem
necessary.
4. The acts and decisions necessary for the implementation of cooperation activities
shall be subject to all the relevant provisions of this Treaty, save as otherwise provided
for in this Article and in Articles K.15 and K.16 of the Treaty on European Union.
5. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of the Protocol integrating the
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.
Treaty on European Union - Title VI. Provisions on police and judicial cooperation in
criminal matters
Article 40
1. Member States which intend to establish closer cooperation between themselves may
be authorised, subject to Articles K.15 and K.16, to make use of the institutions,
procedures and mechanisms laid down by the Treaties provided that the cooperation
proposed:
(a) respects the powers of the European Community, and the objectives laid down by
this Title;
(b) has the aim of enabling the Union to develop more rapidly into an area of
freedom, security and justice.
2. The authorisation referred to in paragraph 1 shall be granted by the Council, acting by
a qualified majority at the request of the Member States concerned and after inviting
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the Commission to present its opinion; the request shall also be forwarded to the
European Parliament.
If a member of the Council declares that, for important and stated reasons of national
policy, it intends to oppose the granting of an authorisation by qualified majority, a
vote shall not be taken. The Council may, acting by a qualified majority, request that
the matter be referred to the European Council for decision by unanimity.
The votes of the members of the Council shall be weighted in accordance with article
148(2) of the Treaty establishing the European Community. For their adoption,
decisions shall require at least 62 votes in favour, cast by at least 10 members.
3. Any Member State which wishes to become a party to cooperation set up in
accordance with this Article shall notify its intention to the Council and to the
Commission, which shall give an opinion to the Council within three months of
receipt of that notification, possibly accompanied by a recommendation for such
specific arrangements as it may deem necessary for that Member State to become a
party to the cooperation in question. Within four months of the date of that
notification, the Council shall decide on the request and on such specific
arrangements as it may deem necessary. The decision shall be deemed to be taken
unless the Council, acting by a qualified majority, decides to hold it in abeyance; in
this case, the Council shall state the reasons for its decision and set a deadline for
re-examining it. For the purposes of this paragraph, the Council shall act under the
conditions set out in Article K.16.
4. The provisions of Articles K.1 to K.13 shall apply to the closer cooperation provided
for by this Article, save as otherwise provided for in this Article and in Articles K.15
and K.16.
The provisions of the Treaty establishing the European Community concerning the
powers of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and the exercise of those
powers shall apply to paragraphs 1, 2 and 3.
5. This Article is without prejudice to the provisions of the Protocol integrating the
Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union.
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